A Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing (1729)
which allowed him to defend his opponent’s right of scriptural exegesis even while disagreeing with its approach and its conclusions. Here too was a conservative Christian different from Whiston “and many other great divines; who seem to pay little deference to the books of the New Testament,

   the text whereof they are perpetually mending in their sermons, commentaries, and writings, to serve purposes; who pretend

    we should have more of the true text by being less tenacious of the printed one

   , and in consequence thereof, presume to correct by critical

    emendations

   , serve

    capital places

   in the

    sacred writers

   ; and who ... do virtually set aside the authority of the scripture, and place those compositions in its stead.” Finally, here was one who, obedient to the spirit of God’s revealed word, rejected the fallacy that messianic prophecy had been fulfilled in Christ in any “literal, obvious and primary sense.”

     [21]

   But though the persona could not accept Whiston’s program, he was not a mere negativist. With growing excitement he argued for allegorical interpretation. At this point the reader discerns that he has been duped, that nowhere has there been a denial of Whiston’s charge that the reading of messianic prophecy in a typical or allegorical or secondary sense is “weak and enthusiastical.” On the contrary, the reader finds only the damning innuendo that the two methods—the allegorical and the literal—differ from one another not in kind but in degree of absurdity. After being protected for a long time by all the twists and turns of his creator’s irony, the persona finally reveals himself for what he is, a man totally insolent and totally without remorse. Never for one moment did he wish to defend the scheme of allegorical prophecy but to attack it. His argument, stripped of its convolutions and pseudo-piety, 
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