teacheth and proveth things by,) which by a pretty surprizing uncouthness in conceit of expression doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto.

   And about sixty years later, despite the work of Hobbes and Locke in calling attention to the importance of semantics, the confusion still existed. According to John Oldmixon (

    Essay on Criticism

   , 1727, p. 21), "Wit and Humour, Wit and good Sense, Wit and Wisdom, Wit and Reason, Wit and Craft; nay, Wit and Philosophy, are with us almost the same Things." Some such confusion is apparent in the definition presented by the

    Essay on Wit

   (1748, p. 6).

   In general it was recognized that there were two main kinds of wit. Both fancy and judgment, said Hobbes (

    Human Nature

   , X, sect. 4), are usually understood in the term

    wit

   ; and wit seems to be "a tenuity and agility of spirits," opposed to the sluggishness of spirits assumed to be characteristic of dull people. Sometimes wit was used in this sense to translate the words

    ingenium

   or

    l'esprit

   . But Hobbes's disciple Walter Charleton objected to making it the equivalent of

    ingenium

   , which, he said, rather signified a man's natural inclination—that is, genius. Instead, he described wit as either the faculty of understanding, or an act or effect of that faculty; and understanding is made up of both judgment and Imagination. The Ample or Happy Wit exhibits a fine blend of the two (

    Brief Discourse concerning the Different Wits of Men

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